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Abstract
This paper brings into focus a link between the investment and ﬁ-
nancing decisions of a ﬁrm which has an access to costly debt ﬁnancing.
Our analysis shows that lump-sum debt issuance costs play a promi-
nent role in a determination of the optimal investment strategy. Faced
with larger lump-sum debt issuance costs, a ﬁrm will optimally set
up a higher-scale investment project in order to "compensate" dead-
weight ﬁnancing costs by higher return. Moreover, in the presence
of lump-sum debt issuance costs, the optimal investment scale of ﬁ-
nancially constrained ﬁrms exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship
with the ﬁrm's borrowing capacity, so that relatively more/less con-
strained ﬁrms will realize smaller investment projects, whereas ﬁrms
with an intermediate borrowing capacity will undertake larger invest-
ment.
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1 Introduction
Recognizing the fact that the Modigliangy and Miller irrelevance theorem
(1958) is not robust in the context of any frictions, a corporate ﬁnance lit-
erature doesn't cease looking for a consistent explanation of the connection
between ﬁnancing and investment decisions. Given a substantial diﬀerence
between the costs of external and internal funding caused by information
asymmetry problems and eventual transaction costs, a question of particu-
lar interest is how the optimal choicees of investment time and the scale of
investment are aﬀected by the tightness of ﬁnancial constraints?
While many studies unanimously advocate for the U-shaped relationship
between the investment time and the tightness of ﬁnancial constraints (see,
for instance, Belhaj and Djembissi (2009), Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010),
Wong(2010), Shibata and Nishihara (2012)), there is a lack of consensus con-
cerning the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on the optimal choice of invest-
ment scale. Earlier theoretical works (Fazzari et al. (1988), Hoshi et al.
(1988), Whited (1992), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Hubbard (1998))
argue that a sensitivity of investment expenditures to cash ﬂows are much
stronger for the ﬁrms which are likely to be ﬁnancially constrained. This fact
suggest about a negative monotonic relationship between the tightness of ﬁ-
nancial constraints and the scale of investments chosen by ﬁrms. Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) provide a conﬂicting evidence, showing that less ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms exhibit higher investment cash-ﬂow sensitivities. Recent
studies of Cleary, Povel and Raith (2007) and Guariglia (2008) report a U-
shaped relation between investment size and internal funds, explaining this
form by a trade-oﬀ between a higher risk of default and a higher expected
investment return of the levered ﬁrm. A theoretical model of Wong (2010)
contributes to this puzzle, showing that a negative eﬀect of higher default
risk and a positive eﬀect of higher investment return resulted from larger
investment will oﬀset each other. As a result, the optimal investment scale
will be independent on the ﬁrm's credit constraints, remaining equal to that
of the all-equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm.
However, it seems to be misleading to discuss the optimal choice of in-
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vestment scale without taking into account external ﬁnancing costs. Allowing
for external ﬁnancing costs and the dynamic aspect of investment, our model
uncovers an inverted U-shaped relationship between the scale of investment
and the ﬁrm's borrowing capacity. A striking evidence we obtain is that this
relationship emerges only in the presence of lump-sum debt issuance costs.
Without lump-sum debt issuance costs, a scale of investment would be com-
pletely independent on the ﬁrm's borrowing capacity, so that a neutrality of
debt in investment intensity established by Wong (2010) would hold even
under signiﬁcant variable debt issuance costs.
It is worth noting that several recent studies have attempted to integrate
external ﬁnancing costs into the analysis of optimal investment decisions.
Lyandres (2007) documents a hump-shaped relationship between the magni-
tude of external ﬁnancing costs and investment, explaining this form by the
interplay between two opposite eﬀects of external ﬁnancing costs on invest-
ment timing. Indeed, external ﬁnancing costs reduce the attractiveness of
current investment, but at the same time also reduce the value of the option
to wait, whereas a scale of investment is found to be monotonically increas-
ing on the investment time. The study of Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010)
examines the impact of variable external ﬁnancing costs on the optimal in-
vestment time in the context of a ﬁxed-scale investment model. They ﬁnd
that low-liquidity ﬁrms will delay investment to avoid present ﬁnancing costs,
whereas high-liquidity ﬁrms will speed up investment to avoid even higher
ﬁnancing costs in future. They associate earlier investment with a higher
investment volume, arguing that the optimal investment scale would exhibit
a reversed U-shaped pattern when plotted against liquid funds. Nishihara
and Shibata (2012) allow for two levels of investment scale and show that
relatively low and relatively high levels of cash reserves imply larger invest-
ment scale, whereas the intermediate levels of cash correspond to the lower
investment scale.
While the above mentioned studies use the ﬁrm's current level of cash
holdings as a proxy for ﬁnancial constraints and consider a discrete choice
of investment scale, we conduct our analysis in the context of explicit credit
constraints, allowing for a continuous choice of investment scale. Indeed,
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in practice ﬁrms often face a quantity credit rationing, so that borrowed
funds represent only a fraction of a required investment amount, whereas a
remaining part has to be ﬁnanced by internal funds. Such a representation of
credit constraints makes it possible to capture endogenous changes in credit
capacity following the changes of investment scale.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 describes the optimal investment decisions of an all-equity ﬁnanced
ﬁrm. In Section 4 we examine the optimal ﬁnancing and investment decisions
of a levered ﬁrm when it faces debt issuance costs. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider an owner-managed ﬁrm protected by limited liability and
endowed with a perpetual investment option. An investment project can
be undertaken at the irreversible cost I(q) which is positively related with
investment intensity, q > 0. Moreover, we assume that I ′′(q) > 0, I(0) ≥ 0
and I ′(0) = 0. Investment intensity aﬀects the scale of stochastic earnings
before interest and taxes (EBIT), qXt, where Xt denotes EBIT per unit of
investment intensity and follows a stochastic process:
dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt, (1)
where W = {Wt,Ft, 0 ≤ t < ∞} is a standard Brownian motion on a
probability space (Ω,F ,P). Investors are risk neutral and discount the future
at a constant rate r > µ.
The ﬁrm operating proﬁts are taxed at the rate θ, so that equity holders
collect a residual operating cash-ﬂow (1− θ)qXt.
A ﬁrm has an access to the external ﬁnancing. In order to ﬁnance a part
of investment costs and to beneﬁt from tax shields, at the investment date τ
the ﬁrm's equity holders can raise an amount b ≤ ψI(q) of perpetual debt,
where ψ reﬂects an exogenously given borrowing capacity of the ﬁrm. The
remaining fraction of investment costs, I(q) − b > 0, is ﬁnanced by equity
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capital.1 However, issuing debt is costly because of information asymmetries
inherent to external ﬁnancing. As Belhaj and Djembissi (2007), we consider
a linear form of debt issuance costs, K(b) = kb+K0, with both variable and
ﬁxed components.2
A debt contact implies that a constant coupon c will be continuously
paid to debt holders until the ﬁrm's default, which occurs when shareholders
cease injecting cash in order to serve the debt. The optimal default trigger
maximizing the ﬁrm's equity value is given by the standard formula:
xL(q) =
β1
β1 − 1
r − µ
r
c
q
≡ δ c
q
(2)
where β1 < 0 is a root of σ2/2β(β − 1) + µβ = r.
Given that after the default the ﬁrm will be run by new owners as an
unlevered concern, we model bankruptcy costs as a fraction γ of the all-
equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm's value.
Equityholders optimally decide about the timing, the scale and the ﬁ-
nancial structure of investment, maximizing ex-ante equity value under the
exogenously given credit constraint. For any coupon c and investment inten-
sity q, let D(Xτ , q, c) denote debt value at the investment time τ , given that
the ﬁrm will be liquidated at the time τL = inf{t ≥ 0 s.t Xt = xL(q)}. Since,
by the absence of arbitrage, we have b = D(Xτ , c, q), the equity holders'
maximization program can be formalized as follows:
Supτ,q,c<∞ E
[
e−rτ (V (Xτ , q, c)− I(q)− kD(Xτ , q, c)−K0)
]
s.t. D(Xτ , q, c) ≤ ψI(q)
(3)
where V (Xτ , q, c) denotes a value of the ﬁrm at the investment time.3
1In the case when I(q) − b < 0 (which is possible only if ψ > 1), equity value at the
investment time increases by b− I(q).
2Issuing equity might be costly as well. However, it is commonly recognized that the
cost of external ﬁnancing exceed the cost of internal ﬁnancing, so we assume the latter to
be zero in order to focus on the impact of external ﬁnancing costs.
3For the expressions of contingent claims used in the model see Appendix A.
4
3 Investment decisions of an all-equity ﬁnanced
ﬁrm: a benchmark
Consider ﬁrst a benchmark case where ψ = 0, so that the investment
project is fully ﬁnanced by equity and the ﬁrm never goes bankrupt. In this
case the equity holders' problem takes the following form:
Supτ,q<∞ E
[
e−rτ
(
(1− θ)qXτ
r − µ − I(q)
)]
= SupxeI ,q
[
((1− θ)νqxeI − I(q))
(
Xt
xeI
)β2]
(4)
where xeI is the investment trigger such that τ = inf{t ≥ 0 s.t Xt = xeI},
β2 > 0 is a root of σ2/2β(β − 1) + µβ = r and ν = (r − µ)−1.
The corresponding optimal investment intensity satisﬁes:
I ′(qe) =
β2
β2 − 1
I(qe)
qe
(5)
whereas the optimal investment trigger is given by:
xeI =
β2
β2 − 1
I(qe)
qe
1
(1− θ)ν (6)
The optimal investment intensity in (5) is chosen in a way to balance
the marginal investment cost and the average investment cost adjusted by
the option value multiple β2/(β2 − 1). Thus, the optimal investment scale
of an all-equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm is constant and completely independent on the
optimal choice of investment time.
4 Investment and ﬁnancing decisions of a lev-
ered ﬁrm
4.1 The case of non-binding credit constraints
First, we are going to consider a solution of the maximization problem
in the case when ψ is large enough, so that the ﬁrm can raise a required
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amount of debt without binding credit constraints. In this case, the credit
constraint in (3) can be omitted and the program can be resolved in two
steps: (i) ﬁrst, for any ﬁxed investment parameters q and xI such that τ =
inf{t ≥ 0 s.t Xt = xI}, we deﬁne the optimal coupon c∗(q, xI); (ii) then, the
problem is solved for the remaining parameters of investment policy and the
optimal coupon is recovered.
For any given q and xI , the optimal c∗(q, xI) maximizing the ﬁrm's value
net of the variable debt issuance costs is given by:
c∗(q, xI) =
h
δ
qxI , (7)
where
h =
[
θ − k
(1− β1)(θ − k)− β1(1− θ)(γ + k(1− γ))
] 1
−β1
(8)
Given the optimal coupon c∗(q, xI), the maximization problem of equity
holders can be rewritten as follows:
SupxI ,q<∞ ((1− θ)νqxI + (θ − k)hνqxI − I(q)−K0)
(
Xt
xI
)β2
(9)
The solution of the problem is given by the optimal investment trigger
xfI =
β2
β2 − 1
I(q) +K0
q
1
(1− θ)ν + (θ − k)hν (10)
and the optimal investment intensity qf which satisﬁes the following equation:
qfI ′(qf ) =
β2
β2 − 1(I(q
f ) +K0) (11)
The optimal coupon will be given by cf = c∗(qf , xfI ).
Lemma 1 qf is increasing on K0.
 Let f1(q) and f2(q,K0) denote respectively the left and the right side of the
equation (11). Both f1(q) and f2(q,K0) monotonically increase on q. Given
that f2(0, K0) > f1(0), the equation (11) has a unique solution q∗(K0). Since
∂f2(q,K0)
∂K0
is increasing on K0, we conclude that q∗(K0) is increasing on K0.
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Thus, similar to the benchmark case with all-equity ﬁnancing, the opti-
mal investment intensity is set independently on both the optimal investment
time and the ﬁrm's borrowing capacity, remaining constant.4 However, un-
der non-zero ﬁxed debt issuance costs, the levered ﬁrm will realize higher
investment as compared to the all-equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm. At the same time,
given higher investment intensity, the investment trigger of the levered ﬁrm
would be lower than the investment trigger of the equity-ﬁnanced ﬁrm when
ﬁxed debt issuance costs are quite small.
To illustrate the impact of debt issuance costs on the ﬁrm's investment
and ﬁnancing decisions in the context of non-binding credit constraints, we
resort to numerical simulations (see Table 1.a-1.b in Appendix B) and obtain
the following evidence:
• The optimal investment intensity, qf , and thus the optimal scale of
investment, I(q)f , are independent on k but increase on K0, since the
ﬁrm will tend to "compensate" higher lump-sum debt issuance costs
by a higher asset return.
• The optimal investment trigger, xfI , is increasing on both k and K0.
Indeed, a higher investment trigger reduces a current discounted value
of ﬁxed debt issuance costs, increasing a value of the ﬁrm's option.
• The optimal coupon value, cf , and thus the ﬁrm's leverage is increasing
with K0, since the ﬁrm will tend to reduce the average cost of debt
issuance by raising more debt. However, the amount of debt decreases
on k, since the variable debt issuance cost reduces the value of tax
shields. As a result, the ﬁrm's leverage ratio D(xfI , q
f , cf )/I(q)f tends
to zero when k → θ.
• The value of investment option calculated at the current moment of
time is decreasing on both k and K0.
4This is in line with the Almeida and Campello (2002) who suggest that the investment
of unconstrained ﬁrms is insensitive to cash ﬂow, taken the latter as a proxy for credit
constraints.
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4.2 The case of binding credit constraints
Consider now the optimal investment and ﬁnancing decisions of the ﬁrm in
the context of binding credit constraints. For any given investment intensity
q and coupon rate c, the binding credit constraint provides the following
investment trigger:
xI(q, c) =
[
1− ψr I(q)
c
1− (1− γ)(1− θ)νδr
] 1
β1
xL(q), (12)
where xL(q) is given by (2).
Then, the equity holders' problem (3) can be rewritten as follows:
Supq,c (V (q, c)− I(q)(1 + kψ)−K0)
(
Xt
xI(q, c)
)β2
, (13)
where V (q, c) is a ﬁrm value under the investment threshold xI(q, c).
The optimal investment and ﬁnancial strategies are determined by the
optimal values of q and c which solves the above problem.
In order to track the impact of debt issuance costs on the investment
intensity, we use the Lagrangian method to obtain the following optimality
condition:
qI ′(q) =
β2
β2 − 1
I(q) +K0(1− λψ( xI
X0
)β2)−1 , (14)
where X0 is a current value of the state variable and λ > 0 is the optimal
Lagrange multiplier, independent on X0.
Proposition 1 Given non-zero ﬁxed debt issuance costs, the optimal invest-
ment intensity of a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm will be aﬀected by its borrow-
ing capacity.
Numerical simulations suggest the existence of an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between the optimal investment intensity q and the ﬁrm's borrowing
capacity ψ that also reﬂects the ﬁrm's leverage (see Table 2.c in Appendix
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B). In other words, a ﬁrm with relatively low or relatively high borrowing
capacity will set up smaller investment project, whereas a ﬁrm with interme-
diate borrowing capacity will undertake larger investment project. In fact,
larger investment scale implies two opposite eﬀects on the ﬁrm's perspectives.
On the one hand, larger investment implies a higher return, which would in-
crease the equity holders' ability to serve the debt and thus would reduce
default risk. On the other hand, under the binding credit constraint, larger
investment is associated with a larger volume of debt, thereby, increasing de-
fault risk. Thus, when a ﬁrm's borrowing capacity is relatively low, the ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates, so that the optimal investment scale is increasing with ψ.
However, as ψ reaches some critical level, the second eﬀect becomes stronger,
so that the optimal scale of investment goes down. It is important to note
that ﬁxed debt issuance costs play a crucial role in the trade-oﬀ between two
described eﬀects. In fact, in the presence of ﬁxed debt issuance costs, larger
investment will reduce a marginal cost of debt issuance, which makes the ﬁrst
eﬀect more pronounced. Without ﬁxed debt issuance costs, two eﬀects would
oﬀset each other and the optimal investment intensity would be constant, as
was shown by Wong (2010).5
Expression (14) also shows that, in contrast to the case of the non-binding
credit constraint, the optimal choice of investment intensity will be aﬀected
not only by ﬁxed debt issuance costs, but by variable costs as well. This
is due to the fact that a choice of investment intensity under the binding
credit constraint becomes inseparable from the choice of investment trigger,
whereas the latter is aﬀected by variable debt issuance costs. Numerical
simulations show that the optimal investment intensity is decreasing with k.
5Examining a simultaneous choice of investment timing, investment scale and leverage
in the presence of variable investment costs, Sarkar (2011) ﬁnds that, generally, investment
scale is ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing on the amount of debt raised, but for high
levels of a tax rate and bankruptcy costs this pattern is reversed. However, his model
doesn't allow for credit rationing and lump-sum ﬁnancing costs.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we contribute to the ongoing investigations of the link be-
tween a ﬁrm's investment and ﬁnancing decisions in the context of external
ﬁnancing costs. We show that, for a ﬁrm which is not ﬁnancially constrained,
a choice of investment intensity will be unrelated to the ﬁrm's debt capacity
and will remain constant. However, in the presence of non-zero lump-sum
debt issuance costs, a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm will realize larger invest-
ment projects for intermediate levels of credit capacity and will undertake
investment projects of lower scales when credit capacity is relatively low/high.
10
Appendix A
A.1. Equity value
The ﬁrm's equity value is given by:
E(Xt, q, c) = (1− θ)
[
qXt
r − µ −
c
r
+
(
c
r
− qxL(q)
r − µ
)(
Xt
xL(q)
)β1]
, (15)
where β1 < 0 is a root of σ2/2β(β−1) + µβ = r and the optimal liquidation
rule xL(q) such that E ′xL(Xt, q, c) = 0 is given by:
xL(q) =
β1
β1 − 1
r − µ
q
c
r
≡ δ c
q
(16)
A.2. Debt value
The value of the ﬁrm's debt is given by:
D(Xt, q, c) =
c
r
−
(
c
r
− (1− γ)(1− θ)
(
qxL(q)
r − µ
))(
Xt
xL(q)
)β1
(17)
A.3. A ﬁrm's value
The value of the ﬁrm is given by the sum of equity and debt:
V (Xt, q, c) =
(1− θ)qXt
r − µ +
θc
r
−
(
θ + γ(1− θ) β1
β1 − 1
)
c
r
(
Xt
xL(q)
)β1
(18)
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Appendix B
We use the following parameter values: market interest rate r = 8%, the
expected growth rate of operating proﬁt µ = 1%, operating proﬁt volatility
σ = 30%, the default cost coeﬃcient γ = 0.3, the tax rate θ = 0.15, the
investment function I(q) = 10 + 5q3. A current value of the state variable is
taken as X0 = 1.
The optimal investment strategy in the benchmark case (all-equity ﬁ-
nancing) is given by qe = 1.8566 and xeI = 4.2582.
B.1. Optimal investment and ﬁnancing decisions when the credit
constraint is not binding
Table 1.a displays simulation results for k = 0.1 and diﬀerent values of
K0. Table 1.b displays results obtained for K0 = 5 and diﬀerent values of
k < θ. We denote F the current value of the ﬁrm investment option, whereas
ρ = D(xI , q, c)/I(q) represents the ﬁrm's leverage ratio.
Table 1.a
k = 0.1
K0 q
f xfI c
f I(qf ) D(xfI , q
f , cf ) ρ F
0 1,8566 4,2282 2,1644 42 24,7629 0,5896 4,1613
1 1,9166 4,5056 2,3809 45,2 27,2392 0,6026 4,0885
2 1,9730 4,7746 2,5973 48,4 29,7155 0,6140 4,0232
3 2,0263 5,0363 2,8138 51,6 32,1917 0,6239 3,9640
4 2,0770 5,2914 3,0302 54,8 34,6680 0,6326 3,9100
5 2,1253 5,5405 3,2467 58 37,1443 0,6404 3,8603
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Table 1.b
K0 = 5
k qf xfI c
f I(qf ) D(xfI , q
f , cf ) ρ F
0 2,1253 5,3258 6,9924 58 70,8100 1,2209 4,1413
0,02 2,1253 5,3769 6,4445 58 66,5943 1,1482 4,0716
0,04 2,1253 5,4250 5,8118 58 61,3926 1,0585 4,0077
0,06 2,1253 5,4691 5,0799 58 54,9698 0,9478 3,9504
0,08 2,1253 5,5080 4,2318 58 47,0209 0,8107 3,9008
0,1 2,1253 5,5405 3,2467 58 37,1443 0,6404 3,8603
0,12 2,1253 5,5645 2,0987 58 24,8034 0,4276 3,8307
0,14 2,1253 5,5780 0,7563 58 9,26800 0,1598 3,8143
B.2. Optimal investment and ﬁnancing decisions when the credit
constraint is binding
Table 2.a displays simulation results for ψ = 0.7, k = 0.1 and diﬀerent
values of K0. Table 2.b displays results obtained for ψ = 0.7, K0 = 5
and diﬀerent values of k < θ. Table 2.c contains simulation outcomes for
K0 = 5, k = 0 and diﬀerent values of ψ ∈ [0.1, 1].
Table 2.a
ψ = 0.7, k0 = 0.1
K0 q xI c I(q) D(xI , q, c) F
0 1,8566 4,2507 2,6192 42 29,4003 4,1591
1 1,9161 4,5242 2,8097 45,1751 31,6225 4,0869
2 1,9723 4,7903 3,0011 48,3585 33,8510 4,0220
3 2,0254 5,0494 3,1928 51,5445 36,0812 3,9631
4 2,0760 5,3025 3,3852 54,7372 38,3161 3,9093
5 2,1243 5,5499 3,5778 57,9305 40,5514 3,8598
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Table 2.b
ψ = 0.7, K0 = 5
k q xI c I(q) D(xI , q, c) F
0 2,1408 5,2565 3,6762 59,0559 41,3391 4,0640
0,02 2,1373 5,3151 3,6554 58,8190 41,1733 4,0212
0,04 2,1340 5,3737 3,6352 58,5892 41,0125 3,9795
0,06 2,1307 5,4323 3,6155 58,3642 40,8549 3,9387
0,08 2,1274 5,4911 3,5964 58,1443 40,7010 3,8988
0,1 2,1243 5,5499 3,5778 57,9305 40,5514 3,8598
0,12 2,1212 5,6087 3,5599 57,7229 40,4061 3,8217
0,14 2,1182 5,6676 3,5423 57,5193 40,2635 3,7844
Table 2.c
k0 = 0, K0 = 5
ψ q xI c I(q) D(xI , q, c) F
0 1,8566 4,2582 42 0,7387
0,1 2,1287 5,5165 0,4717 58,2309 5,82310 3,8527
0,2 2,1319 5,4576 0,9595 58,4466 11,6893 3,8924
0,3 2,1348 5,4041 1,4646 58,6451 17,5935 3,9309
0,4 2,1372 5,3561 1,9881 58,8124 23,5250 3,9678
0,5 2,1391 5,3147 2,5308 58,9418 29,4709 4,0026
0,6 2,1404 5,2811 3,0934 59,0260 35,4156 4,0349
0,7 2,1408 5,2565 3,6763 59,0561 41,3393 4,0640
0,8 2,1403 5,2421 4,2789 59,0210 47,2168 4,0893
0,9 2,1387 5,2393 4,9003 58,9125 53,0213 4,1103
1 2,1359 5,2497 5,5386 58,7221 58,7221 4,1263
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